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Problems with Potential Application of Selected Provisions of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 to Small, Non-Public Banking
Organizations
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002' (SOX or "the Act") was
passed by Congress as a response to a rash of corporate scandals
involving companies such as Enron, WorldCom, and Global
Crossing.2 In the banking industry, only public institutions3 are
required to comply with the Act.4 Large non-public banking
organizations5 technically are not subject to SOX,6 but these
organizations are subject to other federal banking laws and
regulations7 which contain provisions similar to those found in
SOX. The Act's provisions do not apply specifically to small, non-
public institutions,8 and these organizations are not required to
1. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
2. See e.g., Michael A. Perino, Enron's Legislative Aftermath: Some Reflections
on the Deterrence Aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
671, 671 (2002).
3. For the purposes of this Note, the term "public banking organizations" refers
to those banks, savings associations, and bank holding companies which have
registered their securities with one of the four federal banking regulatory agencies
pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See Federal Reserve Board SR
Letter 03-8 from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Division of
Banking Supervision and Regulation, to the Officer in charge of supervision and
appropriate supervisory and examination staff at each Federal Reserve Bank and to
each domestic banking organization supervised by the Federal Reserve (May 5,
2003), http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/SRLETTERS/2003/sr0308.htm (last
visited Feb. 7, 2004) [hereinafter Joint Statement to Non-Public Banks]; 15 U.S.C. §
781(i) (2000) (codifying the portion of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 under
which public banking institutions register their securities with one of the four federal
banking regulatory agencies).
4. See Joint Statement to Non-Public Banks, supra note 3.
5. For the purposes of this Note, the term "large non-public banking
organizations" includes FDIC-insured banks, savings associations, and bank holding
companies which have total assets of $500 million or more and are not public
institutions. See supra note 3 (defining the term "public banking institutions").
6. See Joint Statement to Non-Public Banks, supra note 3.
7. Specifically, large non-public banking institutions that are not subject to SOX
are still subject to Section 36 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act and its
implementing regulations, found at 12 U.S.C. § 1831m (2000) and 12 C.F.R. § 363
(2003), respectively. See id.
8. For the purposes of this Note, the term "small non-public banking
organizations" includes FDIC-insured banks, savings associations, and bank holding
companies which have less than $500 million in total assets and are not public
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comply with the aforementioned federal banking laws and
regulations with which large non-public banks must comply.9
Despite the fact that Congress did not enact SOX to address these
organizations, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
has issued guidance to the small non-public banks which it
regulates that seems to strongly encourage practices similar or
identical to those found in SOX."° While apparently not going as
far as the FDIC in promoting SOX practices," the other three
federal bank regulators - the Federal Reserve Board (FRB), the
Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), and the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) - have also issued joint
guidance encouraging the small, non-public banking organizations
which they supervise to "periodically review their policies and
procedures relating to corporate governance and auditing
matters." 12
While the FDIC's view appears to be stronger than that of
the other federal regulators, 3 such recommended compliance by
all of the federal banking regulators could mean that at some
point, small, non-public banking institutions may have to meet the
same stringent auditor independence, 4 corporate governance, 5
institutions. See supra note 3 (defining the term "public banking institutions"); Joint
Statement to Non-Public Banks, supra note 3 (stating that small non-public banking
organizations are not subject to SOX).
9. Joint Statement to Non-Public Banks, supra note 3, at Attachment.
10. See generally Financial Institution Letter 17-2003 from FDIC to Chief
Executive Officers of FDIC-supervised banking institutions, concerning Corporate
Governance, Audits, and Reporting Requirements (May 5, 2003),
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2003/filO317.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2004),
at Attachment: Applicability of Selected Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 to FDIC-Supervised Banks with Less Than $500 Million in Total Assets That
Are Not Public Companies (outlining the FDIC's stance on compliance with
practices similar or identical to those in SOX by small non-public banks) [hereinafter
FDIC Corporate Governance Letter].
11. See Laura K. Thompson, Conflicting Guidance for Small Banks on Sarb-Ox,
AM. BANKER, May 16, 2003, at 1, 5 (describing the practical concerns of people in the
community banking arena that the FDIC's guidance could be perceived as requiring
certain actions because the FDIC "strongly encourage[s]" small, non-public banks to
improve their corporate governance and auditing procedures through SOX-type
practices, while the joint guidance provided by the FRB, OTS, and OCC "merely
advises" these banks to periodically review their corporate governance and auditing
policies).
12. Joint Statement to Non-Public Banks, supra note 3, at Attachment.
13. See Thompson, supra note 11, at 1.
14. See infra notes 42-50 and accompanying text.
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and financial disclosure 6 standards that public banks must meet,
even though small, non-public institutions generally have fewer
resources to use to satisfy such standards, and typically have less
complex operations than public banks.' 7 Requiring small, non-
public banks to meet the Act's standards not only would be
inconsistent with the Act's purpose,'8 but applying SOX provisions
to small, non-public banks could also have a negative impact on
these banks' regulatory compliance costs, 9 their ability to meet
regulatory standards," and their ability to select directors that
allow them to succeed and grow.2'
Part I of this Note recounts the history and purpose behind
SOX.22 Part II examines the requirements of the most important
provisions of SOX that apply to non-public banks or with which
bank regulators have encouraged non-public banks to comply.
23
Part III discusses the current applicability of these specific
provisions, and guidance thereon, across the entire banking
industry, from public banks and large banks, regardless of
public/private status, to small, non-public banks.24  Part IV
explores potential negative consequences of applying the SOX
provisions discussed in Part II to small, non-public banks.
I. HISTORY AND PURPOSE BEHIND THE ACr
Since 1999, several well-documented and harmful
corporate scandals have come to light.26 The most significant of
15. See infra notes 51-60 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 61-70 and accompanying text.
17. Joint Statement to Non-Public Banks, supra note 3, at Attachment.
18. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (stating
that the Act's purpose is "[t]o protect investors by improving the accuracy and
reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws .....
19. See infra notes 131-151 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 152-154 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 155-161 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 26-36 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 37-70 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 71-123 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 124-161 and accompanying text.
26. See generally Robert Frank et al., Executives on Trial: Scandal Scorecard,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2003, at B1 (providing an overview of a number of recent
corporate scandals).
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these was the debacle of Enron Corporation, as a result of which
investors lost $64.2 billion. 27  Enron executives stand accused of
participating in several illegal actions, including approving overly
aggressive accounting for off-balance sheet partnerships,
concealing information from auditors, and insider trading;28 some
Enron executives have already agreed to plea bargains in
connection with charges brought against them for their
participation in these schemes. 29  Enron's relationship with its
former auditor, Arthur Andersen LLP, raised concerns about
auditor independence because Andersen performed both internal
and external audit services, as well as other consulting functions
for Enron.3 ° J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. and Citigroup, Inc. agreed
to a $305 million settlement with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) for their respective roles in some of Enron's
questionable financing transactions. 3' Enron has also sued these
banks, along with Merrill Lynch & Co., Deutsche Bank AG,
Barclays PLC, and Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, for
their advice and assistance in facilitating and covering up Enron's
questionable transactions.32 Finally, the federal government has
already charged, or may yet charge, individual bankers, lawyers,
accountants, and other professionals with crimes for their actions
in the Enron scandal.33
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., John R. Emshwiller, Ex-Enron Accounting Chief Charged, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 23, 2002, at A5 (noting generally some of the misdeeds in which Enron
executives may have participated).
29. Id.
30. See Thaddeus Herrick & Alexei Barrionuevo, Were Auditor and Client Too
Close-Knit?, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 2002, at Cl. Andersen was also indicted by the
federal government for its destruction of evidence relating to services it provided to
Enron. See Frank et. al., supra note 26.
31. Mitchell Pacelle & Laurie P. Cohen, J.P. Morgan, Citigroup Will Pay $305
Million to Settle Enron Case, WALL ST. J., July 29, 2003, at Al.
32. See Mitchell Pacelle, Enron Files Court Complaint Against Six of Its Former
Banks, WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 2003, at B4. In addition, Congressional investigators
expressed interest in seeing documents related to questionable transactions in which
J.P. Morgan may have helped keep debt off Enron's balance sheet. Jathon Sapsford
& John R. Wlike, Congress Seeks Data From J.P. Morgan on Enron Deal, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 16, 2002, at Cl.
33. See, e.g., Frank et al., supra note 26 (discussing among others, the fates of
David Duncan, Andersen's lead auditor for Enron, who plead guilty in his trial for
Enron-related activities and Nancy Temple, Andersen's in-house counsel, who may
be charged because she wrote a memo instructing Andersen employees to alter
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The debacle regarding Enron, Arthur Andersen, and the
large banks with which Enron did business was not the only
corporate scandal which captured attention; other scandals were
discovered at such companies as Adelphia Communications Corp.,
Global Crossing Ltd., HealthSouth Corp., Qwest Communications
International, Inc., Tyco International Ltd., WorldCom Inc., and
Xerox Corp.3 4  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 represents
Congress' attempt to deal with the problems created by these
numerous corporate scandals discovered since 1999."5 In fact, the
Act's stated purpose is "[t]o protect investors by improving the
accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to
the securities laws .... 36
II. A BRIEF LOOK AT THREE SELECTED PROVISIONS OF THE ACT
Congress intended SOX to protect investors by improving
corporate governance practices in, and disclosures by, all publicly-
traded companies.37 Even though the Act directly applies only to
public companies, in the banking industry, the federal regulators
generally have encouraged small, non-public banking
organizations to improve their practices regarding auditor
independence, bank governance, and financial disclosures.38 While
the FDIC's stance appears to be more explicit in encouraging
small, non-public banking organizations specifically to adhere to
SOX principles when feasible,3 9 the FRB, OTS, and OCC also
generally have jointly encouraged these banks to evaluate and
improve their practices as appropriate." The following provisions
are the most important aspects of SOX with which the federal
documents).
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., Perino, supra note 2, at 671.
36. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
37. Id.
38. See FDIC Corporate Governance Letter, supra note 10, at Attachment:
Applicability of Selected Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 to FDIC-
Supervised Banks with Less Than $500 Million in Total Assets That Are Not Public
Companies; Joint Statement to Non-Public Banks, supra note 3, at Attachment.
39. See Thompson, supra note 11, at 1.
40. See Joint Statement to Non-Public Banks, supra note 3, at Attachment.
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bank regulators have encouraged small, non-public banking
institutions to comply.41
A. Title H - Auditor Independence
Before considering the discrete aspects of Title II of SOX,
it is important to briefly consider changes made by Title I of SOX
to the oversight regime of public accounting firms. Section 101
provides for the creation of a new Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (PCAOB), whose objective is to oversee the
audits of publicly-held companies in order to protect investors'
interests in obtaining accurate and independent audit reports.42
Public accounting firms must register with the PCAOB in order to
provide external audit services for public companies.43
Title II of SOX deals with the independence requirements
of registered public accounting firms that provide external audit
services for companies that have issued publicly-traded securities.'
Section 201 states that registered public accounting firms may not
provide certain non-audit services to their publicly-held clients
while simultaneously providing external audit services to those
clients.45 In addition, audit committees of publicly-held companies
generally must now pre-approve all auditing and permitted non-
auditing services provided by their external auditors46 and must
41. See generally FDIC Corporate Governance Letter, supra note 10 at
Attachment: Applicability of Selected Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
to FDIC-Supervised Banks with Less Than $500 Million in Total Assets That Are
Not Public Companies; Joint Statement to Non-Public Banks, supra note 3, at
Attachment.
42. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 101, 116 Stat. 745, 750
(codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 7211) (Supp. 2003)).
43. § 102(a), 116 Stat. at 753 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 7212(a) (Supp. 2003)).
44. See generally §§ 201-209, 116 Stat. at 771-775 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 2003)).
45. See § 201, 116 Stat. at 771-72 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1(g)
(Supp. 2003)). Generally, the nine prohibited non-audit services are the following:
bookkeeping, systems design, valuation services, actuarial services, internal audits,
human resources functions, investment banking, legal services, and any other services
that the PCAOB deems inappropriate. Id.
46. Id. (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1(h) (Supp. 2003)). But see §
202, 116 Stat. at 772-73 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1(i)(1)(B) (Supp.
2003)) (providing a de minimus exception for small amounts of non-audit services
conducted by the external auditor and approved during a company's external audit
by its audit committee).
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disclose to investors the non-audit services performed by their
external auditors.47  An external auditor also must report to its
client's audit committee on all of that client's critical accounting
policies and on alternative and preferred treatments of that client's
financial information after these treatments have been discussed
with the client's management personnel.48
Section 206, addressing auditor conflicts of interest,
prohibits a registered accounting firm from auditing a public
company if, during the preceding year, an executive in the client
company was employed by the accounting firm and worked on the
company's audit. 49 The Act also imposes an audit partner rotation
requirement on registered accounting firms: lead or reviewing
partners cannot work for more than five consecutive years on a
public client's external audit.5"
B. Title III - Corporate Responsibility
Audit committees of public companies are directly
responsible for overseeing the work of the companies' auditors."
Consequently, the most significant provision of Title III of the Act
is its requirement that each member of a public company's audit
committee be an independent director.52  Audit committee
members may not accept any compensation from the company,
47. § 202, 116 Stat. at 773 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1(i)(2)
(Supp. 2003)).
48. § 204, 116 Stat. at 773 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-l(k) (Supp.
2003)).
49. § 206, 116 Stat. at 774-75 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1(1)
(Supp. 2003)). This provision addresses situations such as the one at Enron, in which
there was an increased risk of collusion that ultimately abetted Enron executives'
corporate fraud. See Herrick & Barrionuevo, supra note 30, at C1 (describing how
many former Andersen employees who had worked on previous Enron audits were
hired by Enron, including Enron's chief accounting officer and its chief financial
officer, while Andersen continued to provide external audit services to Enron).
50. § 203, 116 Stat. at 773 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1(j) (Supp.
2003)).
51. § 301, 116 Stat. at 775-77 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1(m)
(Supp. 2003)). The portions of Title III of the Act which are most relevant to this
Note are sections 301, 302, and 303; the other sections of Title III will not be
discussed, as they are less relevant to this Note. See infra notes 51-59 and
accompanying text.
52. See § 301, 116 Stat. at 776 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1(m)(3)
(Supp. 2003)).
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other than that for service on the company's board of directors,
and may not be an "affiliated person"53 of the company. 4
The chief executive and financial officers of a public
company are directly responsible for certifying the company's
annual and quarterly reports.55 The officers must sign these
reports, verifying that they have reviewed the reports, that the
reports are not misleading, and that the reports fairly present, in
all material respects, the financial condition of the company. 6 In
addition, these officers' signatures on the company's reports
represent their acknowledgement that they are responsible for
maintaining the company's internal controls and that the reports
include their recent evaluation of these controls. The chief
53. There appears to be some confusion as to what the term "affiliated person"
means. The FRB has stated that "affiliated person" for the purpose of SOX § 301 is
defined by reference to the Investment Company Act of 1940 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§80a-2(a)(3) (2000)) and includes any company officer or employee who owns more
than five percent of the voting securities of that company. See Federal Reserve
Board SR Letter 02-20 from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation, to the Officer in charge of
supervision and appropriate supervisory and examination staff at each Federal
Reserve Bank and to each domestic and foreign banking organization supervised by
the Federal Reserve (Oct. 29, 2002), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
boarddocs/SRLETTERS/2002/sr0220.htm, at n.3 (last visited Feb. 7, 2004)
[hereinafter FRB SR Letter 02-20]. However, Congress has given the federal bank
regulators (including the FRB) the power to enforce rules adopted by the SEC
relating to SOX section 301. See § 3, 116 Stat. at 749-50 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C.A.§ 781(i) (Supp. 2003)) (enabling the federal bank regulators to enforce SEC
rules relating to 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (as amended by SOX), which is the statute that is
amended by section 301 of SOX). The SEC has adopted a final rule which generally
defines an "affiliated person" as someone who directly or indirectly controls a
company. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (2003). In addition to this apparent regulatory
confusion, the banking world itself appears to be vexed as to how to satisfy the
independent audit committee standard of SOX section 301. See Bill Stoneman,
Special Report: Community Banking - Governance Reforms a Puzzle for Small
Banks, AM. BANKER, Sept. 19, 2003, at 6A (describing a situation in which one bank,
in its effort to comply with SOX, removed two directors from its audit committee
because it was unsure of their independence: one director's construction company
occasionally does repair work for the bank and bid unsuccessfully to construct a new
branch building; the other director's environmental engineering firm advised the
bank on wetlands issues when the new branch was built and occasionally reviews
environmental issues regarding loan requests).
54. § 301, 116 Stat. at 776 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1(m)(3)(B)
(Supp. 2003)).
55. § 302, 116 Stat. at 777 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 7241 (Supp. 2003)).
56. Id.
57. See id. (requiring the chief executive and financial officers' report to be based
on an evaluation of the company's internal controls within the ninety days preceding
issuance of the report).
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executive officer and chief financial officer must also indicate any
material changes in the company's internal controls that have
occurred after the date of their internal control evaluation.58 They
must certify that they have disclosed to the company's auditors
and to its audit committee all significant internal control
deficiencies, as well as any fraud related to internal controls
uncovered by the organization.59 Finally, pursuant to section 404,
a public company's auditor must report on the fairness of
management's assertions regarding internal controls which are
contained in the company's annual and quarterly reports.6"
C. Title IV - Enhanced Financial Disclosures
Title IV of the Act requires the SEC to implement rules
requiring a public company to disclose whether its audit committee
includes a member who is a "financial expert," as defined by the
SEC in accordance with SOX.6' The SEC's final rule 62 provides
that the "audit committee financial expert,, 63 should have
experience as an auditor or in a position comparable to chief
financial officer in a similar company, an understanding of
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) and financial
statements, experience with internal controls, and an
understanding of audit committee duties.' If a public company's
audit committee does not contain a financial expert, the company
not only must disclose this fact, but it must also disclose why the
audit committee does not contain a financial expert.65
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. § 404, 116 Stat. at 789 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 7262 (Supp. 2003)).
61. § 407, 116 Stat. at 790 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 7265 (Supp. 2003)).
62. Disclosures Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 5110, 5127 (Jan. 31, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 229.401).
63. The SEC defined the term "audit committee financial expert" in place of the
term "financial expert as used in SOX because of opposition to the term "financial
expert." Id. at 5112. The SEC believed that the term "audit committee financial
expert" more accurately reflects the fact that the "expert" plays a key role on the
audit committees of public companies. Id.
64. See id. at 5127.
65. Id.
2004]
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Pursuant to section 406,66 the SEC has adopted a final rule67
that requires public companies to include with their annual and
quarterly reports a statement as to whether they have adopted a
code of ethics for senior financial officers to promote honest and
ethical conduct.68 If a public company has not adopted a code of
ethics for senior financial officers, the SEC requires the company
to explain why it has not done so. 69 Public companies also have to
disclose promptly any changes in their ethics codes or waivers
thereof for senior financial officers.7 °
III. CURRENT APPLICABILITY OF, AND GUIDANCE ON, THESE
SOX PROVISIONS
SOX applies only to public companies, including public
banking institutions.71 While any non-public company may of its
own volition choose to adhere to the principles and practices
contained in the Act, SOX does not apply to non-public
companies, including non-public banks, bank holding companies,
and savings associations. 72  However, large non-public banking
organizations insured by the FDIC still must continue to comply
with Section 36 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act 73 and its
implementing regulations,74 which impose some requirements
similar to those found in SOX. 75 In addition, the FDIC has issued
guidance that seems to strongly encourage all non-public banks,
including small institutions, to adhere to the principles contained
66. § 406, 116 Stat. at 789-90 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 7264 (Supp. 2003)).
67. Disclosures Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 5110, 5127-28 (Jan. 31, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §
229.406).
68. Id. at 5127.
69. Id.
70. See id. at 5128.
71. Joint Statement to Non-Public Banks, supra note 3, at Attachment.
72. Id.
73. 12 U.S.C. § 1831m (2000) (codifying Section 36 of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act).
74. 12 C.F.R. § 363 (2003) (implementing Section 36 of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act).
75. See infra notes 85-110 and accompanying text (noting some of the similarities
in the requirements of SOX and Part 363 of the FDIC's regulations).
[Vol. 8
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in SOX 7 6  The FRB, OTS, and OCC have also issued joint
guidance to non-public banks which encourages them to review
and adjust their governance, financial disclosures, and auditor
independence policies as appropriate, even though it does not
encourage compliance with SOX provisions as explicitly as the
FDIC's guidance." Finally, individual states may choose to
implement laws which mandate SOX-like practices for banks to
which SOX does not directly apply;78 however, because significant
developments in this area have not yet occurred, 79 a discussion
regarding SOX-like requirements at the state level is beyond the
scope of this Note.
A. Public Banking Institutions
Public banking institutions are those which have registered
their securities with the SEC or one of the federal banking
regulatory agencies as appropriate, pursuant to the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.80 Public banks and subsidiaries of publicly-
held bank holding companies must comply with the SOX
provisions discussed above in Part 11.81 Selected sections of these
SOX provisions are codified as amendments to section 10A of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.82 The Act amends the federal
76. See Thompson, supra note 11, at 1; FDIC Corporate Governance Letter,
supra note 10, at Attachment: Applicability of Selected Provisions of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 to FDIC-Supervised Banks with Less Than $500 Million in Total
Assets That Are Not Public Companies.
77. See Thompson, supra note 11, at 1; Joint Statement to Non-Public Banks,
supra note 3, at Attachment.
78. See Laura K. Thompson, Alabama's New SOX?, AM. BANKER, Jan. 14, 2003,
at 1 (discussing a proposed law that would require all Alabama state banks to comply
with new rules regarding, among other things, audit committee, independent auditor,
and codes of ethics for executive officers).
79. See id. at 1 (stating that "Alabama... is thought to be the first state to
consider revising its standards since Sarbanes-Oxley took effect.").
80. See supra note 3 (defining "public banking organizations").
81. See Joint Statement to Non-Public Banks, supra note 3 at Attachment; FDIC
Corporate Governance Letter, supra note 10.
82. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 201-204, 116 Stat.
745, 771-73 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1(g)-(k) (Supp. 2003)); § 206,
116 Stat. at 774-75 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1(1) (Supp. 2003)); §
301, 116 Stat. at 775-77 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1(m) (Supp. 2003));
supra notes 44-54 and accompanying text (describing the provisions of these selected
SOX sections).
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securities laws to allow the federal bank regulators to enforce
these SOX sections, as well as rules and regulations similar to
those adopted by the SEC pursuant to other relevant SOX
provisions against the public banking organizations.83 Other than
to simply provide a brief overview of some especially important
parts of SOX,84 the federal bank regulatory agencies have not
issued any guidance to publicly-held banks regarding these
provisions of the Act.
B. Large Non-Public Banking Institutions
Neither SOX nor the federal bank regulators specifically
require non-public banks with at least $500 million in total assets
to comply with Titles II, III, or IV of SOX.8 5 However, FDIC
83. See § 3(b)(4), 116 Stat. at 749-50 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 781(i)
(Supp. 2003)). The changes adopted in SOX § 3(b)(4) allow the federal bank
regulators to enforce all of the SOX provisions discussed in this Note. See id.; supra
nrtes 44-70 and accompanying text (describing all of the relevant SOX provisions
which the federal bank regulators may enforce).
84. See FRB SR Letter 02-20, supra note 53.
85. See Joint Statement to Non-Public Banks, supra note 3, at Attachment and
FDIC Corporate Governance Letter, supra note 10, at Attachment: Applicability of
Selected Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 to Insured Institutions with
$500 Million or More in Total Assets. However, the following relevant portions of
SOX already apply directly or analogously to large non-public banks: sections 201
through 204 and 206 (all regarding auditor independence), section 301, (regarding
audit committee composition), and section 404 (regarding auditor attestation of
management's assertions about internal controls). See FDIC Corporate Governance
Letter, supra note 10, at Attachment: Applicability of Selected Provisions of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 to Insured Institutions with $500 Million or More in
Total Assets. Part 363 of the FDIC's regulations contains applicable rules which are
similar, but not identical, to SOX section 302 (regarding managerial responsibility for
financial statements and internal controls, and reports thereon). See 12 C.F.R. §
363.2 (2003). While Part 363 requires the audit committees of FDIC-insured banks
with over $3 billion in total assets to include members with banking or financial
management experience, this requirement does not appear to be substantially similar
to the requirement of SOX section 407 that public companies disclose whether their
audit committees contain at least one "financial expert." Compare 12 C.F.R. § 363.5
(2003) with Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 407, 116 Stat. 745, 790
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7265 (Supp. 2003)). The FDIC has also said that it does not
expect non-public banks to comply with the "financial expert" disclosure
requirement of section 407. FDIC Corporate Governance Letter, supra note 10, at
Attachment: Applicability of Selected Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
to Insured Institutions with $500 Million or More in Total Assets. Finally, there is no
provision in Part 363 that corresponds to SOX section 406 (regarding disclosures
related to managerial codes of ethics). See 12 C.F.R. § 363 (2003) (containing no
provision analogous to SOX section 406). However, the FDIC's guidance to non-
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insured institutions with at least $500 million in total assets,
whether they are public or non-public, have been subject to federal
banking laws requiring independent audits and governing audit
committees and financial reporting" since the FDIC Improvement
Act of 1991,87 which improved supervision of banking
organizations in the wake of the savings and loan crisis in the
1980s.88
The FDIC's regulations state that a bank's relationship
with its external auditor should satisfy the independence
requirements adopted by the SEC.89 Because the SEC adopted
the auditor independence provisions of sections 201 through 204,
and 206 of SOX,90 FDIC-insured, non-public banks with at least
$500 million in total assets must follow the SEC regulations
implementing these sections of the Act.91
Part 363 of the FDIC's regulations also provides that each
FDIC-insured bank with at least $500 million in total assets must
maintain an audit committee comprised of independent outside
directors92 to perform such functions as reviewing significant
accounting policies with management and the external auditor,
reviewing the adequacy of internal controls, and overseeing the
bank's internal audit function. 93 This requirement is effectively
identical to the independent audit committee requirement in SOX
public banks encourages compliance with section 406. FDIC Corporate Governance
Letter, supra note 10, at Attachment: Applicability of Selected Provisions of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 to Insured Institutions with Less Than $500 Million in
Total Assets.
86. 12 U.S.C. § 1831m (2000); 12 C.F.R. § 363 (2003).
87. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
88. See id. (listing the improvement of the supervision and examinations of
banking organizations as the purpose of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act of 1991).
89. 12 C.F.R. § 363, App. A (2003).
90. See 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01 (2003) (implementing SOX sections 201 through 203,
and 206); 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-07 (2003) (implementing SOX section 204).
91. FDIC Corporate Governance Letter, supra note 10, at Attachment:
Applicability of Selected Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 to Insured
Institutions with $500 Million or More in Total Assets.
92. 12 C.F.R. § 363.5(a) (2003).
93. 12 C.F.R. § 363, App. A (2003).
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section 301. 9' Also under Part 363, an FDIC-insured banking
organization with at least $500 million in total assets must submit
to the appropriate regulating agency a management report, signed
by the bank's chief executive officer and chief financial officer,
which states that management is responsible for the preparation of
the bank's financial statements.95 In addition, this report must
contain a statement of management's responsibility for the bank's
internal controls and an assessment by management of the
effectiveness of those internal controls as of the end of the bank's
fiscal year.96 These requirements are similar to the provisions in
SOX regarding management's responsibility for financial
statements and internal controls;97 however, the FDIC recognizes
differences between Part 363 and SOX, and has stated that a
report that complies with SOX section 302 may not comply with
Part 363 of the FDIC regulations.98 For example, one major
difference in these reports is that a Part 363 report must contain a
statement that management is responsible for preparing a
company's financial statements;99 on the other hand, a report in
compliance with SOX section 302 must only state that
management has no knowledge of a material misstatement in, or
omission from, a company's financial statements.1°° However, the
FDIC views the auditor's report on management's internal control
assertions, which is required by SOX section 404, as substantially
similar to the auditor's report required by Part 363."°' Finally, Part
94. Compare id.; 12 C.F.R. § 363.5(a) (2003) with Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745, 775-77 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 78j-1(m) (Supp. 2003)).
95. 12 C.F.R. § 363.2(b) (2003).
96. Id.
97. Compare id. with Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 302. 116
Stat. 745, 777-78 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 7241 (Supp. 2003)) and § 404, 116 Stat. at
789 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 7262 (Supp. 2003)).
98. See FDIC Corporate Governance Letter, supra note 10, at Attachment:
Applicability of Selected Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 to FDIC-
Supervised Banks with $500 Million or More in Total Assets.
99. See 12 C.F.R. § 363.2(b)(1) (2003).
100. See § 302(a)(2), 116 Stat. at 777 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 7241) (Supp. 2003).
101. See FDIC Corporate Governance Letter, supra 'iote 10, at Attachment:
Applicability of Selected Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 to FDIC-
Supervised Banks with $500 Million or More in Total Assets (recognizing that the
language used in SOX section 404 and Part 363 is substantially similar).
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363 requires any FDIC-insured bank with total assets in excess of
$3 billion to have members on its audit committee who have
"banking or related financial management expertise."'' 0 2  This
requirement is somewhat analogous to SOX section 407, which
requires public companies to have at one audit committee member
who meets the SEC's definition of "financial expert;"'' 0 3 however,
by its terms, this provision of Part 363 is limited in its applicability
only to very large banks"° and requires audit committee members
to have different expertise than that required by SOX." 5
The FRB, OTS, and OCC stated in their joint guidance that
they do not foresee applying these SOX provisions to any banks
which they regulate and to which these provisions currently do not
apply.10 6 However, in its guidance, the FDIC stated that it has
considered possible amendments to Part 363 of its regulations,
which would extend the provisions of SOX discussed in this Note
to large non-public banks." 7 Because the FDIC would develop
these changes to Part 363 with the other regulatory agencies,' s it is
unclear whether and to what extent any of the provisions of the
Act not currently applicable to banks with at least $500 million in
total assets would be applied to these banks. It is also unclear, if
the FDIC decided on its own to attempt to apply SOX principles
by analogy to the non-public banks which it insures but does not
supervise,1 °9 whether such banks would be subject to the FDIC's
102. 12 C.F.R. § 363.5(b) (2003).
103. See § 407, 116 Stat. at 790; supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text
(discussing SOX section 407).
104. See 12 C.F.R. 363.5(b) (2003) (requiring only FDIC-insured banks with more
than $3 billion in total assets to have audit committee members with "banking or
related financial management expertise").
105. Compare id. with Disclosures Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 5110, 5127 (Jan. 31, 2003) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. § 229.401).
106. Joint Statement to Non-Public Banks, supra note 3.
107. FDIC Corporate Governance Letter, supra note 10, at Attachment:
Applicability of Selected Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 to FDIC-
Supervised Banks with $500 Million or More in Total Assets.
108. Id.
109. The FDIC insures but does not supervise state Federal Reserve System
member banks (supervised by the FRB), national banks (supervised by the OCC), or
savings associations (supervised by the OTS). See 15 U.S.C. § 781(i) (2000).
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decision or to their supervising agency's decision not to apply SOX
principles to such banks." °
C. Small Non-Public Banking Organizations
Neither SOX nor bank regulators compel non-public banks
with less than $500 million in total assets to comply with Titles iI,
III, or IV of SOX; Part 363 of the FDIC regulations also does not
apply to these banks."' However, the FDIC has issued guidance
encouraging the small non-public institutions that it supervises to
adhere to SOX principles when feasible." 2 Perhaps less explicit in
their encouragement about adoption of SOX principles," 3 the
other bank regulatory agencies jointly issued their own guidance,
which applies only to the small, non-public institutions that they
supervise, regarding important provisions of the Act. 14 While the
two sets of regulatory guidance appear to take different tones with
regard to how much the application of SOX principles to small,
non-public banks is favored,' '5 both sets of guidance generally
advise small, non-public banks to improve their auditor
independence, corporate governance, and financial disclosure
practices as appropriate, perhaps using SOX as a guide for
improvement.' 16
110. In such a case, only state banks which are not members of the Federal
Reserve System would not be subject to conflicting guidance from the FDIC and
another federal bank regulator because the FDIC would both insure and supervise
these banks.
111. See Joint Statement to Non-Public Banks, supra note 3; FDIC Corporate
Governance Letter, supra note 10.
112. See FDIC Corporate Governance Letter, supra note 10, at Attachment:
Applicability of Selected Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 to FDIC-
Supervised Banks with Less Than $500 Million in Total Assets That Are Not Public
Companies.
113. See generally Thompson, supra note 11.
114. Joint Statement to Non-Public Banks, supra note 3.
115. See generally Thompson, supra note 11. But see Rob Garver, In Brief: FDIC
Reassures Privately Held Banks, AM. BANKER, July 11, 2003, at 20 (stating that the
FDIC has said that it will not apply SOX principles to a wider range of banks than
will the other federal bank regulators).
116. See generally Joint Statement to Non-Public Banks, supra note 3; FDIC
Corporate Governance Letter, supra note 10, at Attachment: Applicability of
Selected Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 to FDIC-Supervised Banks
with Less Than $500 Million in Total Assets That Are Not Public Companies.
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For example, while none of the federal bank regulators
require non-public banks with less than $500 million in total assets
to obtain external audits, prior joint guidance from all four of the
federal regulators has encouraged them to do so." 7 This guidance
was reiterated in both the FDIC's guidance on SOX to small non-
public banks and the joint guidance released to non-public banks
by the FRB, OTS, and OCC.1 8 Both sets of guidance generally
state that if small non-public banks choose to obtain external
audits, they are encouraged to employ independent auditors and
to have independent audit committees. 1 9 However, the FDIC
perhaps goes further in its guidance, and specifically states, for
example, that it encourages small, non-public banks to adopt codes
of ethics for senior financial officers, 12' as section 406 of the Act
requires for publicly-held companies.21 The FDIC also
encourages small, non-public banks to disclose periodically
whether they have adopted such a code of ethics and the reasons
for not adopting an ethics code if they have not done so.'2 2
On the other hand, the OTS, FRB, and OCC have not
issued specific guidance regarding the adoption of codes of ethics
117. Rescission of Policy Statement Regarding Independent External Auditing
Programs of State Nonmember Banks and Adoption of the Interagency Policy
Statement on External Auditing Programs of Banks and Savings Associations , 64
Fed. Reg. 57,094 (Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. Oct. 22, 1999) (announcing the joint views
of the FDIC, FRB, OTS, and OCC regarding external auditing policies of banking
organizations) available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/1999/FIL9996.pdf
(last visited Feb. 7, 2004).
118. Joint Statement to Non-Public Banks, supra note 3 at Attachment; FDIC
Corporate Governance Letter, supra note 10, at Attachment: Applicability of
Selected Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 to FDIC-Supervised Banks
with Less Than $500 Million in Total Assets That Are Not Public Companies.
119. See Joint Statement to Non-Public Banks, supra note 3 at Attachment; FDIC
Corporate Governance Letter, supra note 10, at Attachment: Applicability of
Selected Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 to FDIC-Supervised Banks
with Less Than $500 Million in Total Assets That Are Not Public Companies.
120. FDIC Corporate Governance Letter, supra note 10, at Attachment:
Applicability of Selected Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 to FDIC-
Supervised Banks with Less Than $500 Million in Total Assets That Are Not Public
Companies.
121. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 406, 116 Stat. 745,
789-90 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 7264 (Supp. 2003)).
122. FDIC Corporate Governance Letter, supra note 10, at Attachment:
Applicability of Selected Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 to FDIC-
Supervised Banks with Less Than $500 Million in Total Assets That Are Not Public
Companies.
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for senior financial officers in small non-public banks, or regarding
the disclosure of the presence or absence of a "financial expert" on
the audit committees of these banks. These agencies have said,
though, that these organizations are encouraged to review
periodically and revise their bank governance and financial
disclosure practices when doing so is feasible, considering the size
and complexity of each small, non-public bank.'23
IV. POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF APPLYING SOX PRINCIPLES
TO SMALL, NON-PUBLIC BANKS
While none of the four federal banking regulatory agencies
currently apply the principles contained in SOX to any non-public
banking institutions,'24 community banks are concerned that
regulators may apply the Act's provisions to non-public banks.'25
Even absent formal application of SOX principles to non-public
banks by the federal bank regulators, community banks are
concerned that individual regulators might be able to pressure a
small, non-public bank into a practice advanced in SOX by
suggesting to the bank that such compliance is feasible and should
be done.26 While the goal of enforcing compliance with SOX
among small, non-public banks would be to "[raise] the bar on
corporate governance,"' 27 such enforcement has at least three
potential negative consequences for these banks: increasing
regulatory compliance costs;'28 imposing an extremely difficult
regulatory burden; 2 9 and restricting the growth of small, non-
public banks. 3 °
123. Joint Statement to Non-Public Banks, supra note 3 at Attachment.
124. See id.; see also FDIC Corporate Governance Letter, supra note 10.
125. See AMERICA'S COMMUNITY BANKERS, 2003 POLICY POSITIONS 46, available
at http://www.acbankers.org/government/03PolicyBook.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2004).
126. See Stoneman, supra note 53, at 6A (containing a statement by the president
of a small, privately-held bank in North Carolina that he believes bank regulators will
pressure his bank to put a "financial expert" on his bank's audit committee).
127. Id.
128. See infra notes 131-151 and accompanying text.
129. See infra notes 152-154 and accompanying text.
130. See infra notes 155-161 and accompanying text.
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A. Increasing Regulatory Compliance Costs
Some small public banks have decided to go private to
avoid the extra costs that accompany compliance with SOX. 3'
Furthermore, experts also predict that many banks will decide not
to go public in order to avoid the additional compliance costs
associated with the Act.1 32  Some items contributing to the
increased compliance costs may be auditing fees, director
compensation, time and effort expended on compliance efforts,
and record-keeping requirements associated with enhanced
disclosures. 133
As discussed, the Act prohibits auditors from providing
certain non-audit services to a client while serving as that client's
external auditor.'34 As a result, external audit costs are expected
to rise, because audits have historically served as loss leaders for
accounting firms, which sold external audit services at low rates in
order to attract clients to whom they could later sell more lucrative
internal audit outsourcing, technology, and other consulting
services.135 In addition, audit fees could rise because the Act
requires auditors to spend more time reporting to their clients'
audit committees and to report on management's assertions about
internal controls.
1 36
A standard practice of community banks is to entice
professionals to serve on their boards of directors by allowing
them to earn fees by providing consulting services to the banks.'37
Because SOX requires that all audit committee members be
131. Laura K. Thompson, Some Small Banks Delist to Avoid Sarbanes-Oxley, AM.
BANKER, Mar. 26, 2003, at 1.
132. Id.
133. See infra notes 134-147 and accompanying text.
134. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing SOX section 201).
135. See Calmetta Coleman & Cassell Bryan-Low, Audit Fees Rise, and Investors
May Pay Price, WALL ST. J., Aug. 12, 2002, at Cl; Barbara A. Rehm, Bottom-Line
Adjustments to Auditing's New World, AM. BANKER, June 6, 2002, at 1. Audits have
historically served as loss leaders for accounting firms: "[less than a quarter of the
$384 million the 14 largest U.S. banking companies paid their auditors [in 2001] went
to cover the cost of external audits." Id.
136. See Coleman & Bryan-Low, supra note 135.
137. Katie Kuehner-Hebert, Sarbanes-Oxley Trumped in One State, AM. BANKER,
Jan. 30, 2003, at 1, 6.
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independent,' banks could not implement this practice with
regard to board members who would serve on the bank's audit
committee. Payment for serving on the bank's board of directors
might have to increase to compensate for the fact that banks could
no longer lure professionals who would serve on a bank's audit
committee by promising consulting opportunities to those
professionals.'39
In addition, as many rural banks may not have access to
independent "financial experts" to serve on their audit
committees,"' these banks could have to resort to electing
"financial experts" from metropolitan areas to serve on their
boards of directors and audit committees, who could require
increased compensation for their service.'41 If these banks could
not obtain "financial experts" for their audit committees, under
SOX section 407, they would have to disclose in their financial
statements that their audit committees do not contain "financial
experts."' 142  As a result, these banks could suffer "market
consequences."'' 43  Presumably, such "market consequences"
would include diminished investor and customer confidence in the
financial reports issued by these banks, since their audit
committees would not contain "financial experts." Consequently,
investors could discount the values of these banks' securities, and
customers could take their business elsewhere.
The Act also requires corporate senior financial officers to
take on additional responsibility for maintaining and reporting on
a company's internal controls.'" As a result, these officers are
likely to spend more time reviewing and testing a company's
138. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745, 775-77
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1(m) (Supp. 2003)).
139. Kuehner-Hebert, supra note 137, at 6.
140. Todd Davenport, Finding Board 'Experts' Likely to Be a Tall Order, AM.
BANKER, Oct. 23, 2002, at 6.
141. See generally id. (stating that few individuals qualified to serve as "financial
experts" on audit committees would be interested in joining the board of directors of
a distant small bank).
142. § 407, 116 Stat. at 790 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 7265 (Supp. 2003)).
143. Todd Davenport, 'Expert' Definition Also Drawing Big Banks' Ire, AM.
BANKER, Oct. 23, 2002, at 1, 4.
144. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text (describing the Act's




internal controls, and may cause banks to purchase expensive new
compliance software to manage internal controls. 14 These efforts
go hand in hand with increased record-keeping requirements to
document the senior financial officers' reviews and tests of internal
controls. 4 6 Finally, boards of directors must adopt codes of ethics
for senior financial officers, 147 which in turn necessitates additional
time and effort to be expended by boards to develop, maintain,
and keep records of these codes.
Smaller, non-public banks generally have fewer resources
to devote to compliance with regulatory requirements and
typically operate with less complexity than publicly-held banks.'
48
Non-public banking institutions with at least $500 million in total
assets are already subject to many of these increased costs of
complying with SOX. 149  However, applying the principles
contained in the relevant SOX provisions to non-public banks with
less than $500 million in assets would put a severe strain on these
banks' limited resources. 5 ' Such application might also provide
only minimal benefits to the banks and their investors, because
investors in these banks probably are more familiar with the
financial status of the banks than investors in public banks, and
thus would not be protected by the additional strictures regarding
auditor independence, corporate governance, and enhanced
disclosures imposed by SOX.'
145. See Phyllis Plitch, A Piece of the Action: Corporate Governance is Hot, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 27, 2003, at R9.
146. See id.
147. § 406, 116 Stat. at 789-90 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 7264 (Supp. 2003)).
148. Joint Statement to Non-Public Banks, supra note 3, at Attachment.
149. See supra notes 85-110 and accompanying text (regarding the specific SOX
provisions and other federal banking regulations with which large non-public banks
must expend significant resources to comply).
150. See Thompson, supra note 131, at 1.
151. See generally id. (implying that some smaller public banks are going private
because shareholders in small banks consider the time and cost savings achieved by
not complying with SOX to be more valuable than any benefits that may be achieved
by conforming to the Act).
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B. Imposing an Extremely Difficult Regulatory Burden
If all of the principles contained in the relevant SOX
provisions were applied to small, non-public banks, these banks
would find it very difficult to procure separate external and
internal auditing firms and to assemble a truly independent audit
committee. 11 In addition, non-public banks in rural locations
could discover that finding a "financial expert" to serve on their
audit committees may be problematic because of the lack of
qualified individuals within these rural areas. 53 Thus, small, non-
public banks in rural communities could find it very difficult, if not
impossible, to comply if bank regulators required them to satisfy
SOX-like requirements regarding auditor independence, audit
committee independence, and the presence of a "financial expert"
on the audit committee.'54 The additional provisions of SOX
would simply add to the burden on these banks to comply with
enhanced regulatory requirements, and could lead to such
consequences as their acquisition by larger banks with the
resources and ability to comply with SOX.
C. Restricting the Growth of Small, Non-Public Banking
Institutions
Arguably, applying the principles contained in the relevant
SOX provisions to small, non-public banks could increase their
ability to access the financial markets because these banks would
not become or remain privately-held solely to avoid compliance
with SOX.'55 These banks would be subject to SOX regardless of
their public/private status; thus they would not be dissuaded from
entering the public markets simply to avoid compliance with
SOX. "' 6 The removal of this barrier to going public would allow
152. Id.
153. Davenport, supra note 140, at 6.
154. Id.; see Thompson, supra note 131, at 1.
155. Contra Thompson, supra note 131, at 1 (documenting at least five cases in
which banks went private to avoid compliance with SOX). The Act currently may be
causing some publicly-held small banks to go private, and it also may be causing some
privately-held banks not to go public because of its stringent requirements. Id.
156. Contra id.
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these banks easier access to capital, increased public exposure, and
increased ability to attract qualified personnel, potentially
resulting in growth of the banks that decide to go public."7
On the other hand, small, non-public banks may want their
directors to be local to a rural area in order to help these banks
identify and solicit customers.5 8 In addition, these banks may feel
that their boards should be comprised primarily of people whose
expertise lends itself to developing the business of these banks,
instead of simply directors whose expertise is in complying with
bank regulations. 59 If the audit committee independence and the
audit committee "financial expert" requirements were applied to
small, non-public banks, these institutions might have to try to
elect directors from other areas in order to find persons who would
qualify for service as independent directors or as "financial
experts" on these banks' audit committees.16 Furthermore, if
these requirements were to apply to small, non-public banks, many
of these banks would be put in the possibly undesirable position of
having boards comprised of persons who are directors because of
their expertise as "financial experts," instead of their perceived
ability to govern and grow these banks.'61
V. CONCLUSION
Congress passed SOX in an attempt to heighten investor
protection after a wave of corporate scandals. 62 The Act and the
regulations implementing it amend the federal securities laws to
require, among other things, increased auditor independence,
better corporate governance, and enhanced financial disclosures
157. See Stephen J. Redner, Thinking of Going Public? Think Twice, then Read
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 521, 522 (2002)
(considering briefly some of the advantages of going public).
158. See Davenport, supra note 140, at 6.
159. See id. (stating the opinion of the chairman and chief executive officer of a
small New York bank that "community banks would suffer if their boards were made
up primarily of accountants, rather than business-development experts.").
160. See generally supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text (discussing the
difficulty that small banks in rural communities could have in securing "financial
experts" to serve on their boards of directors and audit committees).
161. See generally Davenport, supra note 140, at 6.
162. See supra notes 26-36 and accompanying text (discussing the history and
purpose of SOX).
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among all public companies.163 There are several provisions of the
Act which are especially relevant to the banking industry;'
6 4
however, these provisions apply only to public banks. 65 While the
FDIC has made some of these provisions applicable to large non-
public banking institutions, 166 none of the relevant provisions of
SOX are specifically applicable to small, non-public banks.
167
However, community bankers are still concerned about the extent
to which regulators may apply these provisions of the Act to small,
non-public banks.
168
Nevertheless, there are at least three arguments against
bank regulators applying the principles contained in the SOX
provisions discussed to small, non-public banks. 169  First,
application of SOX to these banks would greatly increase costs of
compliance to these banks, 170 which generally have fewer resources
to devote to compliance with bank regulations.' The operations
of these banks are less complex than publicly-traded banks,172 and
investors in these banks probably are more familiar with the
financial status of these banks than are investors in public banks.
As a result, only slight benefits would come at significantly higher
costs of compliance to small, non-public banks if SOX standards
were applied to small, non-public banks.
173
Second, requiring these banks to comply with the principles
in the relevant SOX provisions would be unduly burdensome. 4
163. See supra notes 37-70 and accompanying text (outlining some of the most
significant sections of the Act).
164. See id.
165. Joint Statement to Non-Public Banks, supra note 3; FDIC Corporate
Governance Letter, supra note 10.
166. See supra notes 85-110 and accompanying text (discussing the applicability of
SOX provisions and other federal banking regulations to large non-public banks).
167. See Joint Statement to Non-Public Banks, supra note 3; FDIC Corporate
Governance Letter, supra note 10.
168. See America's Community Bankers, supra note 125, at 46.
169. See supra notes 131-161 and accompanying text (arguing against the
application of SOX-like standards to small, non-public banks).
170. See Thompson, supra note 131, at 1.
171. Joint Statement to Non-Public Banks, supra note 3, at Attachment.
172. Id.
173. See generally Thompson, supra note 131, at 1.
174. See supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text (noting the high degree of
difficulty that small banks, particularly those in rural areas, could experience in their
efforts to comply if they were required to satisfy the Act's standards).
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Even if small, non-public banks could cope with the increased
costs of compliance created by the application of SOX principles,
these banks would probably find it very difficult, if not impossible,
to find independent auditors, audit committee members, and
"financial experts," as would be required by the application of the
principles contained in selected SOX provisions. 75  Finally,
requiring small, non-public banks to comply with the Act could
lead these banks to choose their directors based on concerns about
complying with the audit committee independence or "financial
expert" requirements of SOX.'76 Choosing directors on this basis
could inhibit the growth of these banks because directors chosen
primarily for SOX compliance purposes might be less qualified to
develop the business of these banks. 77 Regulators can avoid
imposing burdensome compliance costs and restricting the growth
of small banks by choosing not to apply the selected provisions of




176. See supra notes 155-161 and accompanying text.
177. Id.
20041
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